# 2NC---UKRR R5---Send

## K

#### It is new! They said it themselves.

**Park 25** [Jiyoon Park, Debater at the University of Michigan, Gmail exchange between csulbom@gmail.com, jiyooon.park@gmail.com, ebarrett.5210@gmail.com, ukrr@googlegroups.com, “SUBJECT: Run for the Roses---Race 5---Michigan BP (AFF) v. CSU Long Beach OM (NEG)---Dallas P] cmeow

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| |  | | --- | | Jiyoon Park | | 11:35 AM (0 minutes ago) |  |  |
| |  | | --- | | to me, 25-UKRR, Eleanor | | | |


**It is new and will be sent at start time.**

**V/r,**

**Jiyoon L. Park** | Political Science Bachelor of Arts

**University of Michigan Undergraduate**

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#### They were late and didn’t care about disclosing. Proves they don’t care about tournament rules or fairness.

**UKRR 25** [University of Kentucky, “25Run for the Roses: Welcome Email”, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1EILHGRY6rYuxKD0UHIE0JYP9w6fzH\_dG\_xsRiYmChmg/edit?tab=t.0] cmeow

Disclosure Expectations: This should be completed no later than 8:30AM ET each morning for rounds 1 and 4. All other rounds should **complete disclosure** for their next round **immediately following the 2AR** of your previous one.

#### **That proves the subject formation paradox, and turns the fairness paradox.**

Tam 15 [Nicoladie, University of North Texas, “A Decision-Making Phase-Space Model for Fairness Assessment,” SciencePG] recut cmeow

1.2. Decision Dilemma and Conflict Resolution

The selection of the decision choice is often governed by the desired outcome in which the decision-maker has to decide which of the two variables is more important to choose to optimize. A conflict in decision occurs when maximization of one variable will minimize the other, making it impossible to maximize both. Thus, the decision requires choosing between one of the two variables to maximize, when no other alternatives are available.

For the decision to choose between fairness and monetary gain, it is often assumed that monetary gain will override fairness for the decision in economic transactions, while fairness will override monetary gain for the decision in social transactions. But sometimes, there is the **paradoxical decision** that people can choose to forgo **maximization** of either **fairness** or monetary gain to obtain the desired outcome that seems **counter-intuitive**.

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This paper will explore the theoretical relationship between these two decision criteria, and determine that a logically consistent decision can be made by choosing the fairness criterion, without necessarily choosing the monetary gain criterion to resolve the conflict. Experimental confirmation of the decision model is provided in the companion paper [1] to confirm that the decision can be made using fairness as the decision criterion without necessarily relying on monetary gain as a criterion In examining the decision-making process, many studies use fairness as a factor to determine how decisions are made in economic transactions [2-5] and distributive justice [6-8]. Fairness is also used as a factor to determine how decisions are affected in social interactions [9-21]. Because what is considered as fair (or unfair) is often biased by an individual’s subjective perception, and this bias can alter the decision made by an individual. Thus, it is important to delineate the underlying decision-making criteria so that we can quantify which factor is more important in influencing a decision. Humans are not the only species that use fairness as a criterion for making decisions, primates also use fairness as a factor to make their decisions [22]. Thus, the decision- making process is conserved across species in evolution from primates to humans, which suggests that there is a generalizable universal principle underlying the decision- making process. 1.3. Ultimatum Game as a Tool to Determine the Decision- Making Process in Relation to Fairness Decisions based on fairness have been studied extensively using the classical Ultimatum Game (UG) experimental paradigm in behavioral economics [2, 23-27]. UG is a split- the-money game where the human subject’s decision-making process is deduced from the decision to accept or reject the monetary offer, depending on whether the offer is perceived as fair or not [27]. The rule of the UG is that a proposer offers an amount of money to share with the responder. The responder is asked to make a decision to accept or reject the proposed offer. If the responder decides to accept the money, both keep the money; otherwise, both lose the money. Thus, the decision to accept or reject the offer in UG depends on whether it is better to maximize the monetary gain or maximize fairness in the decision criterion. This provides a useful tool to determine which decision variable — fairness or monetary gain — is more important to use as the decision criterion. Since the rule of UG requires losing the money if the responder rejects the offer, it creates a conflict for inequitable offers, in which the responder cannot maximize fairness and monetary gain at the same time. If the responder chooses money, it would not be fair. If the responder chooses fairness, it cannot gain the money. Thus, it creates a dilemma for the responder to decide which of the two decision criteria is more important to maximize. This provides the condition in which the underlying decision-making process can be examined theoretically, using a logically consistent model, without violating any logical reasoning, or contradicting any decision criteria. Numerous computational models for hypothesizing the decision-making process based on fairness have been developed to describe how fairness is evolved in UG [25, 26, 28-34] using economic game theories [4-7, 35, 36]. We will introduce a different theoretical model to account for the decision-making process that can use a single criterion — fairness — without requiring choosing both fairness and monetary gain as the criteria to resolve the dilemma. Previous decision-making model has incorporated the relativity of fairness considerations to describe how fairness and monetary gain/loss considerations without compromising the decision for fairness over monetary gain [1, 37-40]. This paper will derive a novel decision-making criterion using the geometric quadrant of the decision-space in the fairness- equity stimulus-response function for determining how a decision is made (see Fig. 1 below). 1.4. Relativity in Fairness Assessment in the Decision- Making Process In assessing fairness in the decision-making process, there is an implicit comparison between two entities — self- regarding and other-regarding concerns [13, 14, 41]. Without such comparison, equality and fairness would not exist. When a comparison is made, it is usually based on one frame of reference relative to another (i.e., comparing between self and others). For example, when someone asks us how fair it is, it usually involves an implicit computation to compare others relative to ourselves. In computing subjective fairness, it compares self in relative to others, using a self-centered frame of reference in the comparison. When the frame of reference is switched from a self-centered one to an other-centered one, fairness is also changed from fair into unfair relatively — without changing the amount of disparity between them. On the other hand, objective fairness is computed by comparing the disparity relative to both parties (self and others) using a neutral party’s (a third person’s) standpoint. Thus, objective fairness is computed by including other- regarding concerns using an other-centered frame of reference, while subjective fairness is computed by including only self-regarding concerns using a self-centered frame of reference. Thus, the decision using fairness as the criterion can change depending on whether a self-centered or an other- centered frame of reference is used as the decision criterion. 2. The Relativistic Fairness-Equity Model Expressing the above relativistic relationships mathematically, let us define f as a quantifiable measure of fairness as a vector, and d as the disparity vector between self and others. Then the level of fairness perception in relation to disparity is given by: f = k ⋅ f (d) + b (1) where k is the fairness sensitivity coefficient, b is a constant representing the baseline fairness level, and f(d) is a function of the disparity vector, which can be either a linear or a nonlinear function. The disparity measure is a relativistic measure that is opposite to the equity measure. Without loss of generality, the disparity vector (d) is a vector difference between oneself and others when comparing a quantity — in the case of UG, the monetary difference — between two persons in the proposed monetary offer. The disparity measure can take on a positive or a negative value, depending on whether the disparity is in favor of oneself in the comparison. For instance, if an offer is a bigger amount to oneself than the amount to the other person, then the disparity is a positive value. If the offer is a lesser amount to oneself than the amount to the other person, then the disparity is a negative value. If the offer is the same for both the self and the other person, then the disparity is zero. Since the vector d is a signed quantity, Eq. 1 automatically accounts for the relativity of fairness — what is fair (f) for the self is unfair (–f) for the other person. This relativity in fairness is automatically computed by the change in the sign of disparity from a positive (d) vector to a negative (–d) vector, when the frame of reference is switched from a self- centered frame of reference to an other-centered frame of reference. 2.1. Decision Threshold Using Fairness as a Decision Criterion Note that Eq. 1 also corresponds to the classical stimulus- response (SR) function for fairness in physiological or psychological systems. This fairness stimulus-response function also corresponds to the input/output (I/O) function in computer science. The stimulus is disparity, and the response is fairness. For the UG paradigm, the stimulus is the amount of monetary disparity between the two persons in the offer (or the offer-ratio), which will result in either monetary gain or loss if the responder accepts or rejects the offer, respectively. The stimulus-response function is usually a non-linear sigmoidal function in psychological or physiological systems, rather than a linear function. Since the operating range of most living systems lies in the linear physiological region (in the middle of the sigmoidal stimulus-response function), for simplicity, we will use this linear operating range as a first approximation in our model. That is, given the disparity stimulus d, a person will respond with a fairness perception computed according to Eq. 1. If the decision is based on fairness as a criterion, then the fairness stimulus-response function can be used to determine the fairness threshold in which a person decides to switch from a rejection decision to an acceptance decision. Thus, using this relativistic fairness-equity model, it will allow us to quantify the threshold in which a decision is made, and determine whether monetary gain can be captured in the fairness decision, without using monetary gain as a decision criterion. 2.2. Relativity in Fairness Assessment by Including both Self-Regarding and Other-Regarding Concerns If the decision incorporates self-regarding concerns, it uses the self-centered frame of reference to evaluate fairness for the decision criterion. If the decision incorporates other- regarding concerns, then it uses the other-centered frame of reference to evaluate fairness for the decision criterion. This relativistic model of fairness can account for both self-centered fairness (i.e., how fair it is to “me”) and other- centered fairness (i.e., how fair it is to “you”) by Eq. 1. That is, the equation implicitly incorporates not only a self- centered perspective of fairness (using a local frame of reference), but also an other-centered (non-self) view of fairness (using a global frame of reference). 2.3. Switching Frame of Reference in the Evaluation of Fairness Perception By default, this vectorial model has already encapsulated the inclusion of reference frame implicitly by the signed vector, d, in which relative fairness is computed — i.e., “fairness to me” is computed by f = k•ƒ(d), while “fairness to you” is computed by the opposite vector, f = k•ƒ(–d). To explicitly express the relativity of fairness, let us denote “fairness to me” as f (using a self-centered frame of reference), and “fairness to you” as f' (using the other- centered frame of reference), with the primed notation. Then “fairness to others” is given by: f′ = k′ ⋅ f (d′) + b′ (2) Thus, the decision threshold can be determined by either Eq. 1 or Eq. 2, depending on whether only the self-regarding concerns is incorporated into the decision or the other- regarding concerns are also incorporated into the decision. 2.4. Derivation of Decision Criterion Based on Fairness If the decision is based on fairness, then the criterion to accept or reject an offer is determined by the level of fairness. Let’s say that the decision threshold, θ, is located at neutral fairness level (θ = 0), then the decision is to accept the offer if it is fair, and reject the offer if it is unfair. The decision, δ, would be quantified by: +1, if f ≥ 0 δ=−1, iff≥0 (3) where δ = +1 represents an acceptance decision while δ = –1 represents a rejection decision. If the decision threshold is located at a positive fairness level (θ > 0) for a fair perception or a negative fairness level (θ < 0) for an unfair perception, then the decision is determined by: 2.5. Fairness Bias by Shifting the Baseline Level of Fairness Perception The baseline level of fairness perception is given by the y- intercept of the stimulus-response function f = k•f(d) + b, i.e., the constant b in Eq. 1. Thus, any bias in the fairness baseline level is represented by a change in the constant, b. If the baseline bias is toward a more fair level, then the constant, b, will increase. If the baseline bias is toward the unfair level, then the constant, b, will decrease. This quantification of this fairness bias will allow us to determine how a decision can be affected by a change in the fairness baseline level. 2.6. Decisions Bias Resulted from Changing the Baseline Level of Fairness Perception

<<PARAGRAPH INTEGRITY RESUMES>>

Let us assume, without loss of generality, that the decision criterion is fairness, then the decision would be determined by the level of fairness perceived by the person. Furthermore, if the decision threshold were set according to the fairness level as defined by Eq. 4, then any change in fairness baseline level would alter the decision threshold accordingly.

That is, any **bias** in the **fairness** perception will also bias the **decision**. In other words, if the decision to accept is determined by fairness, and if the **decision** to **reject** is determined by **unfairness**, then when the **fairness perception** is shifted/switched from fair to unfair. The decision, δ, will also change/switch from acceptance (δ = +1) to rejection (δ = –1) according to Eq. 3, if the decision threshold is set at θ = 0. For any other non-zero decision threshold, the decision, d, is given by Eq. 4.

The above logic is generally assumed in the decision- making process when fairness is used as the criterion by most of the UG studies [42-47]. But there are exceptions to the above assumption that seem paradoxical. Sometimes, humans accept **unfair offers**, while other times they may reject **fair offers**. When this occurs, it is often assumed that the decision is either irrational or the **decision** is made using some other **criteria** other than **fairness** [42-47]. But this assertion may not be necessary. We will show below, by using the relativistic fairness-equity model, that the decision can still be made with fairness as the criterion without being irrational, and without incorporating some other factors other than fairness as the criterion.

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2.7. Fairness Bias by Changing the Fairness Sensitivity Fairness perception can also be biased by a change in fairness sensitivity rather than a change in fairness baseline. Fairness sensitivity is quantified by the slope, k, of the stimulus-response function in Eq. 1. If the slope, k, increases, the **sensitivity to fairness** is **heightened** with a much more **exaggerated sense** of **fairness**. If the slope, k, decreases, the sensitivity to fairness is diminished with an indifference perception to fairness. Thus, there are two types of fairness biases — baseline bias and sensitivity bias. **Baseline bias** affects the sense of what is **fair** or **unfair**, whereas **sensitivity bias** affects the heightened or diminished **awareness** of **fairness** or **unfairness**. Baseline bias is quantified by the y-intercept, b, and sensitivity bias is quantified by the slope, k, of the fairness stimulus-response function, f = k•f(d) + b, in Eq. 1. By the same token, if the **decision** criteria were **based** on **fairness**, then fairness baseline, fairness sensitivity, or both can **bias the decision**. Thus, a decision may be altered by changing the y-intercept, b, or the slope, k, of Eq. 1. This summarizes the dependence of decision on fairness biases mathematically. 3. Graphical Representation of the Decision Phase-Space Quadrants Let us represent the objective disparity, d, graphically by the x-axis (independent axis), and the subjective fairness, f, by the y-axis (dependent axis) based on the fairness stimulus- response function, f = k•f(d) + b, in Eq. 1 (see Fig. 1). The same graph is essentially divided into the left-half and the right-half by the y-axis representing inequity (hypo-equity) and hyper-equity, respectively. The graph is also divided into the upper-half and the lower-half by the x-axis, representing a fair and an unfair perception, respectively. When a decision is made, it is made based on the condition of fairness and equity according to the specific quadrant as described below (see Fig. 1). 3.1. Interpretation of the Decision-Space in the Relativistic Fairness-Equity Quadrants Combining the above fairness and equity interpretations, the decision-space in which the decision is made can also be subdivided by four quadrants (see Fig. 1): (a) Upper-left“fairandinequitable”quadrant; (b) Upper-right “fair and hyper-equitable” quadrant; (c) Lower-right“unfairandhyper-equitable”quadrant; (d) Lower-left “unfair and inequitable” quadrant. +1, δ =  − 1 , if f ≥ θ i f f ≥ θ ( 4 )  <<FIGURE OMITTED>> The interpretations of the fairness perception in each of the quadrant are provided below: (a) If the decision is made in the upper-left quadrant decision-space, then it is a lenient decision — it is based on the condition of feeling fair even though it is inequitable (see Fig. 2). (b) If the decision is made in the upper-right quadrant decision-space, then it is a fair decision — it is based on the condition of feeling fair when it is hyper- equitable (see Fig. 2). (c) If the decision is made in the lower-right quadrant decision-space, then it is a greedy decision — it is based on the condition of feeling unfair, even though it is hyper-equitable (see Fig. 2). (d) If the decision is made in the lower-left quadrant decision-space, then it is an unfair decision — it is based on the condition of feeling unfair when it is inequitable (see Fig. 2). 3.2. Relativistic Interpretation of the Fairness-Equity Quadrants when the Frame of Reference is Switched If the frame of reference for evaluating fairness is switched from self to others, then the fairness-equity quadrant graph would become a mirror image of the decision-space graph in Fig. 1. That is, what is hyper-equitable to self is inequitable to others, and vice versa. Thus, these graphs represent subjective fairness based on their own frame of reference. The only exception to this subjectivity is the center dividing line at the absolute equitable offer (disparity d = 0 at x-axis origin), where it is equitable to both self and others, objectively. At this vertical y-axis, the proposed offer is absolutely equitable for both self and others. Thus, the dividing vertical line represents objective fairness relative to any neutral third party (independent of the relative self- centered or other-centered frame of reference). <<FIGURE OMITTED>> 3.3. Decision Criterion Based on Offer-Ratio If the decision criterion were based on the monetary offer- ratio in UG, then it also corresponds to the decision criterion based on the disparity variable in the relativistic fairness- equity model. For instance, if the acceptance decision criterion were set at a specific offer-ratio (at a specific disparity), then the decision space would be divided vertically into two halves instead of four quadrants. The vertically dividing-line is the decision threshold that is based on disparity. This dividing-line is a given by: d=ε (5) where ε is the specific offer-ratio (or disparity) used to determine an acceptance decision. The decision criterion based on disparity is given by: +1, δ =  − 1 , if d ≥ ε i f d < ε ( 6 ) 3.4. Determination of the Decision Threshold using Both Fairness and Disparity Criteria Given that the fairness stimulus-response function in Eq. 4 is used as one of the decision criteria and the disparity in Eq. 6 as the other criterion, then the intersection of these two decision thresholds would determine the exact location (quadrant) within the fairness-equity space in which the decision were made. If both fairness and disparity were used as the criteria, then the decision space where the decision is made is given by: +1, δ =  − 1 , if f ≥ θ and d ≥ ε i f f < θ a n d d < ε ( 7 )

<<PARAGRAPH INTEGRITY RESUMES>>

Any decisions made outside of the decision space in Eq. 7 would appear as irrational, because it is inconsistent with using both fairness and disparity as the criteria. But such paradoxical decisions are not necessarily irrational, but rather caused by using solely one decision variable as the criterion — such as using either fairness or disparity as the criterion. Examples of such paradoxical decision spaces are:

+1, if f ≥ θ and d < ε  
δ =  − 1 , i f f < θ a n d d ≥ ε ( 8 )

+1,

if f < θ and d ≥ ε i f f ≥ θ a n d d < ε

δ =  − 1 ,

( 9 )

It is only paradoxical if both criteria were used, as in Eq. 8 and Eq. 9. But if one of the criteria were used, as in Eq. 4 or Eq. 6, no paradox or irrationality would exist. The paradoxical decision spaces in Eq. 8 and Eq. 9 would merely be a subspace captured by either Eq. 4 or Eq. 6, resolving the paradox or irrationality. That is, if a person decides based solely on the fairness criterion, irrespective of the disparity in the monetary offer, or if money is not an issue for the person, then it is perfectly rational to reject money, because money is not an issue. There can be many other reasons to reject an equitable or accept an inequitable, nonetheless monetary gain/loss is not one of the criteria.

3.5. Identification of Decision Criteria in the Decision Space with Respect to the Fairness-Equity Quadrant

Given that the specific perception of fairness and equity can be represented by the fairness-equity quadrants, we can identify the decision criteria by the graphic location of the quadrant in which the decision threshold is located. That is, if the acceptance decision is located in the hyper-fair and hyper-equitable (upper-right) quadrant, and the rejection decision is located in the unfair and inequitable (lower-left) quadrant, then the decision made is often considered as logical/rational. The exact location of the decision threshold in these quadrants is dependent on the fairness biases, as reviewed in the above sections.

3.6. Rational Decisions due to a Shifting of the Decision Space into a Paradoxical Fairness-Equity Quadrant

On the other hand, if the decision is located in the hyper- fair and inequitable (upper-left) quadrant, then the decision appears to be paradoxical, when a person considers inequitable offers as fair in the decision. Most often, this **paradoxical decision** is assumed to be irrational, but in fact, is **logically consistent** with the relativistic fairness-equity model. This is because the location of the decision criterion is merely being shifted to the upper-left quadrant by the fairness biases in the stimulus-response function. Thus, this results in a decision bias that seems paradoxical or illogical, but it is merely caused by a shift of the decision space into a different fairness-equity quadrant, without contradicting any logical principles for fairness assessment or decision-making. It is merely a result of the **fairness bias**, which **subsequently affects the decision.**

Similarly, if the **decision** is located in the **unfair** and hyper- equitable (lower-right) **quadrant**, then the **decision** appears to be **paradoxical** when a person considers **hyper-equitable offers** as **unfair** in the **decision.** This paradoxical decision is also appeared to be irrational, but in fact, is logically consistent with a shift in the decision space into the lower- right fairness-equity quadrant, without contradicting any logical principles for fairness assessment or decision-making.

The paradoxical decision can be identified as a shift of the **decision space** in the fairness-equity quadrant caused by a **shift** in the **fairness bias.**

3.7. Decisions Based on Fairness Criterion Rather than the Monetary Gain Criterion

Because the amount of monetary gain or loss in UG is directly linked to the amount of disparity in the offer when a person accepts or rejects the offer, an acceptance decision would result in a monetary gain, and a rejection decision would result in monetary loss. Thus, if monetary gain or loss were the criterion for the acceptance or rejection decision, then monetary offer of any amount would always result in an acceptance decision, independent of fairness. Therefore, the decision space for acceptance decision would span all four fairness-equity quadrants.

Thus, the monetary gain or loss is a consequence of the decision rather than the criterion of decision in UG. That is, if a person accepts the money, it will always be a monetary gain. If a person rejects the money, it will always be a monetary loss. The monetary gain or loss is caused by the decision. If the decision were to use monetary gain or loss as the criterion, then the decision is already predetermined, without any regards to fairness or disparity. If the decision were not predetermined by the consequence of monetary gain or loss, then a person could use fairness, disparity/equity or both in the decision criterion (assuming fairness and disparity/equity were the two given choices in the decision, as in the UG paradigm).

**If** either one criterion — **fairness** or disparity/equity — **were used** as the **decision criterion**, then **no paradoxical** or **seemingly irrational decision** **would exist**. If both criteria — fairness and disparity/equity — were used as the decision criteria simultaneously, then there are some conditions in which the decision may appear to be paradoxical (as in Eq. 8 or Eq. 9). But such paradoxical decision is merely a shift of the decision criterion into the decision space, which is caused by a shift in the fairness perception (i.e., caused a fairness bias) rather than being irrational. The experimental evidence in the companion paper [1] also showed that human subjects behaved precisely as predicted by the relativistic fairness- equity model, which is logically consistent without being irrational when they rejected the monetary offer.

**4. Summary**

The mathematics of the decision-making process using fairness and disparity as the decision criteria is derived theoretically using a relativistic fairness-equity model. The results show that the logically consistent **decisions can be made using either fairness or disparity, or both criteria, without being irrational or paradoxical.** The monetary gain or loss is a consequence of the decision in UG rather than a decision criterion, unless the decisions were predetermined by the monetary gain or loss. These logically consistent decision criteria were deduced graphically by the location of the fairness-equity quadrant in which the decisions were made. The location of the decision space quantifies the rationale in which the decisions were made, i.e., the decision criteria used in making such a decision.

#### The permutation is HUMAN PARASITISM, using the labor of black people as a form of political blackface that makes enslavement logics inevitable.

Grimes 2018 (Kate, is Assistant Professor of Theology at Villanova University. “LET BLACK PEOPLE BE: A Plea for Racial Specificity in the Afterlife of Africanized Slavery” JRE 46.3:497–520. © 2018 Journal of Religious Ethics)

Despite errors in execution, the underlying drive to position non-black people of color and white Hispanics as like African Americans may appear noble and ordered towards the end of inter-racial solidarity. But in truth it replicates the parasitic relation that has animated both slavery and its ongoing afterlife. As Orlando Patterson summarizes, slavery comprises the ultimate form of human parasitism (Patterson 1982, 14, 206 and Hartman 2007, 6). And in the afterlife of slavery, antiblackness supremacy aims to preserve this parasitic relation. Africanized slavery and its ongoing afterlife shape more than just the material and economic realm; they continue to structure this country’s collective imagination (Hartman 2007, 6). In this way, political and ethical discourse and power rely heavily upon and often operate as a form of parasitic consumption of the histories, experiences, and resistance movements of black people. How so? Just as white slave owning British colonists declared themselves “slaves of king George,” so “the women’s movement, the Chicano liberation movement, queer movements, and many more have adopted the strategies, tactics, and theory of the Black liberation movement” (Wilderson 2010, 21; Black Lives Matter Movement 2016). More conservative political movements do so as well. Expressing a widely held tenet of libertarian ideology, Kentucky Senator Rand Paul decries government taxation as a form of enslavement, arguing that “if [the government] taxes you at 100% then you’ve got zero percent liberty,” but, “if [it] taxes you at 50% you are half slave, half free” (Kaczynski 2015). In a similar way, the firmly held belief that “the moral dimension of the case for life are similar to the moral dimension of the case against slavery” represents “an entirely mainstream, pro-life view” (French 2015).6 Almost without exception, all political movements depict themselves as the new abolitionists and the victims whose cause they champion as the new black slaves. In a sense, all Americans wear political blackface. This occurs un-coincidentally. The analogy of slavery does to blackness in the symbolic realm what the practice of slavery did to enslaved people over the course of their lives: it reduces it to an infinitely fungible instrument. When deployed analogically, blackness takes whatever shape nonblack people assign it. Just as enslaved people served as chefs, agricultural experts, concubines, gestational surrogates, musicians, farmworkers, blacksmiths, drivers, wet nurses, among other positions, so black history and suffering serve the ends of non-black political movements. Antiblackness supremacy aims to deny to both blackness and to black people lives of their own; it prefers that they live primarily in, through, and for the sake of those who enlist them in their service.7 While enslavement strived simultaneously to strip enslaved people of their individuality and exploit it, the analogy of blackness exploits and obfuscates the uniqueness of antiblackness supremacy. Just as slavery comprises the ultimate form of human parasitism, slavery and antiblackness have served as the ultimate political and moral analogy. Why does this analogy enact a parasitical antiblackness? First, this rhetorical trope falsely positions antiblackness supremacy as a relic of the past, an evil we have overcome. In this way, the LGBT rights movement compares itself to not the fight against the war on drugs, but the civil rights movement.8 Anti-abortion activists, for example, similarly compare the fetus not to black victims of extrajudicial murder like Mike Brown, but to the black slave. Second, in positing an analogy between the way the United States treated black people in the past and the way it currently treats, for example, LGBT people, fetuses, or the coercively taxed, those who deploy this trope accuse their opponents of caring more about black people than they do other groups. Even though non-black people both benefit from and perpetuate antiblackness supremacy, the analogy of slavery misrepresents black people as possessing rights and freedom that other groups are denied. As a result, black people appear uniquely favored and protected. Third, this rhetorical move takes black people’s suffering and struggles and expropriates it on behalf of another group. In so doing, the analogy of slavery and/or antiblackness supremacy ultimately renders contemporary black demands for freedom and justice less coherent. Indeed, if everyone is a slave, then no one is a slave. The universalization of the struggle against slavery makes everyone simultaneously deserving of and deprived of freedom except for actual slaves. Since black people already have freedom, they are not entitled to more of it. This background helps to explain why racial concepts and terminologies that fail to distinguish antiblack racism from other forms of injustice risk recapitulating the symbolic underpinnings of slavery’s afterlife. The injustices inflicted upon non-black people of color differ from those endured by black people much more than they resemble them. This holds even more true with respect to people of Latin American descent who are classified as white. Since antiblackness supremacy shapes our collective moral, political, and theological imaginations, we non-black theologians invariably struggle to denounce racism without relying upon antiblack tropes and analogies. In this way, for example, Cassidy and Mikulich proclaim, “the fact that whites do not think of themselves as living in a white ghetto is an integral problem of hyper-incarceration today” (Cassidy and Mikulich 2007, 82). In truth, they continue, “whites tend to not be aware of the fact that as of the 2010 census of 16 major metropolises, whites are more self-segregated than any other racial or ethnic group” (Cassidy and Mikulich 2007, 19). Even while explicitly condemning the white supremacist prison and ghetto, these scholars portray the ghetto as a choice ignorant people make rather than a uniquely stigmatizing form of spatial violence society imposes upon a select group of people. Ironically, Cassidy and Mikulich make an anti-black argument against anti-blackness: according to the implicit logic of this rhetorical appeal, white people who enact antiblack forms of racial segregation are the real blacks.9

#### Labor unions are Zionist in the squo. Labor unions view the plan as a win, which makes them lean more towards Trump.

Schurke, 25 [Jeff Schuhrke is a labor historian and assistant professor at the Harry Van Arsdale Jr. School of Labor Studies, SUNY Empire State University. “Boycotting Apartheid: Comparing US Labor’s Responses to the South African and Palestinian Freedom Movements.” *Brill Journal of Labor and Society*, 28, June 12, 2025, <https://brill.com/view/journals/jlso/28/2/article-p183_002.xml>, Accessed 13 August 2025] omard

In 1987, at the height of a dynamic social movement in the United States and around the world demanding an end to the racist apartheid system in South Africa, United Mine Workers of America (umw) president Richard Trumka penned an essay in the Los Angeles Times urging Congress to escalate sanctions against Pretoria. A young, energetic, and high-profile labor leader, Trumka was the co-chair of a nationwide campaign to boycott Shell Oil because of its vast operations in South Africa. “Sanctions alone cannot eradicate apartheid; that task is ultimately left to the people of South Africa themselves,” he wrote. “But economic pressure and political isolation of the South African government can hasten the day when justice and freedom reign in that troubled land” (Trumka, 1987). Twenty-two years later—long after the ultimate success of Black South Africans in securing political and civil rights—Trumka assumed the helm of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (afl-cio), the national umbrella group comprising most of the country’s unions, including his own umw. One month into the new job, Trumka gave a speech in which he denounced the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (bds) movement. The movement had been launched a few years earlier by a coalition of Palestinian civil society organizations to achieve a measure of dignity and justice for their long-suffering people by applying the same kinds of nonviolent tactics against the State of Israel as had been used against apartheid South Africa. In his speech, Trumka suggested bds was inherently antisemitic due to Israel’s identification as a Jewish state and announced that the afl-cio was “proud … to oppose boycotting Israel” (Jewish Labor Committee, 2010). Hundreds of rank-and-file US union members responded by signing an open letter to Trumka expressing their disagreement with his anti-bds stance and encouraging American labor officials to support the Palestinian liberation movement just as they had championed popular efforts to dismantle apartheid in South Africa. “You rightly argued [in the 1980s] that, ‘economic pressure and political isolation of the South African government can hasten the day when justice and freedom reign in that troubled land,’” the letter stated, quoting Trumka’s own Los Angeles Times piece from 1987. “Two decades later, the cause of ‘justice and freedom’ for Palestinians requires no less of you as president of the afl-cio” (Labor for Palestine, 2009). Trumka offered no reply. To this day, neither the afl-cio nor any of its national affiliates have endorsed bds. The discordance between Trumka’s enthusiastic championing of the Free South Africa Movement in the 1980s and his later hostility towards the Palestinian-led bds campaign highlights an unexamined tension within the US labor movement and the history of its involvement in foreign affairs. While researchers have long studied the international activities of American unions—particularly the afl-cio’s partnership with the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency to advance Washington’s imperialist foreign agenda (especially during the Cold War) (Radosh, 1969; Sims, 1992; Scipes, 2010; Carew, 2018; Schuhrke, 2024)—organized labor’s drastically different responses to the South African and Palestinian freedom movements have received far less scholarly attention. Juxtaposing these responses can demonstrate how US labor’s stances on global issues are determined more by the political views of top union officials than by the popular demands and democratic decisions of rank-and-file members, resulting in an inconsistent and even hypocritical approach to international solidarity. The purpose of this essay is not to gauge US labor’s precise impact on either the South African anti-apartheid struggle or the Palestinian bds movement, nor is it to showcase similarities between South African and Israeli forms of discrimination, dispossession, and oppression. Instead, the objective here is to highlight the ways that American unions choose to either embrace or reject calls for international solidarity—in both word and deed—and how, in the case of Palestine, the choice has been shaped by labor officialdom’s traditional alliance with Zionism. Further, examining the contrast between union leaders’ righteous support for the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and their stubborn opposition to bds highlights yet another facet of the systematic dehumanization that Palestinians face in US society. Comparisons between South Africa and Israel, often addressing the question of whether Israel’s treatment of Palestinians amounts to the crime of apartheid, have been made by politicians, activists, scholars, journalists, and jurists for several decades (Davis, 1987; Frankel, 1988; Temko, 1988; Akenson, 1991; Carter, 2006; Pappé, 2015; Soske and Jacobs, 2015; Greenstein, 2023). Perhaps the earliest example was in 1961, when South Africa’s far-right prime minister and apartheid architect Hendrik Verwoerd declared that “[Israelis] took Israel from the Arabs after they had lived there for a thousand years. In that I agree with them. Israel, like South Africa, is an apartheid state” (Verwoerd, quoted in Polakow-Suransky, 2010: pp. 240–241). Four years later, Syrian-Palestinian scholar and diplomat Fayez Sayegh compared “the Afrikaner apostles of apartheid in South Africa” to “the Zionist practitioners of apartheid in Palestine” (Sayegh, 1965: p. 27; Erakat and Reynolds, 2022). Many South African leaders of the anti-apartheid movement, including Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, also frequently likened their struggle to that of the Palestinians (Fayyad, 2020; McGreal, 2021). Besides such rhetorical comparisons, there were also direct ties between the two states. From the early 1970s onward, Tel Aviv maintained a secret military alliance with Pretoria. Israel exported its high-tech weaponry to apartheid South Africa, while South Africa provided Israel with the uranium and other raw materials needed to expand its covert nuclear arsenal (PolakowSuransky, 2010). Some trade unionists in the United States were pointing to the parallels between Israel and South Africa as early as 1973, when approximately two thousand Arab American auto workers in Detroit went on a one-day wildcat strike demanding that the leaders of their union, the United Auto Workers (uaw), liquidate the hundreds of thousands of dollars of union funds they had invested in Israeli state bonds. In the run-up to the strike, the workers’ community allies explained in a local newspaper advertisement that “purchase of Israeli bonds is regarded by these workers similarly as would a uaw investment in racist South Africa … be regarded by black workers” (Pennock, 2017: p. 186). The uaw’s purchase of Israeli bonds was only one among a number of examples of US labor’s decades-long support for the State of Israel and the Labor Zionist movement more generally. From the 1920s to the 1940s, American union officials—both Jews and non-Jews—became increasingly enamored with Labor Zionism in Mandatory Palestine as embodied by the Histadrut. Functioning as both a Jewish-only trade union federation and a conglomeration of Jewish-exclusive farms, housing developments, banks, hospitals, clinics, and transportation networks, the Histadrut set out to lay the economic foundation for a future Jewish state. Histadrut leaders actively pursued the financial support of US unions to carry out this work. Because it prioritized class collaboration and nation-building over class conflict and revolution, Labor Zionism appealed to anti-radical “business unionists” in the United States. At the same time, the more progressive elements in US labor were impressed by the Histadrut because it put certain socialistic ideas into practice, such as establishing cooperative enterprises and implementing social welfare programs (Lockman, 1996; Glazer, 2020; Fromer, 2024). Thus, throughout the interwar years, US unions donated millions of dollars to the Histadrut’s efforts to construct the economic basis for a Jewish state in Arab Palestine. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, American union leaders in 1948 intensely lobbied President Harry Truman to send weapons to Zionist militias in Palestine and to immediately recognize Israel upon its founding (Hahn, 2001; Howard, 2017). In the Cold War decades, the afl-cio’s anticommunist officials regarded Israel as a bulwark against Soviet influence in the geostrategic and oil-rich Middle East. They also believed Labor Zionism to be a positive, worker-led economic development model that could be emulated across the Third World as an alternative to communism. Therefore, in the latter half of the twentieth century, the US labor movement invested millions more dollars in Israel by purchasing state bonds. Every time the country was at war with its Arab neighbors, American union leaders would also issue public statements expressing unwavering support for Israel, condemning its enemies, and calling on the US government to increase military aid to the country (New York Times, 1982; Hahn, 2001; Howard, 2017; Schuhrke, 2023; Fromer, 2024). No such friendly relationship ever existed between US labor officialdom and South Africa’s apartheid government. Indeed, from the moment the apartheid system was first instituted in 1948, American unions routinely condemned it through public statements, convention resolutions, and testimony before Congress (African American Labor Committee, 1983). Thus, by the 1980s, when the Free South Africa Movement was in full stride, it was comparatively easy for the US labor movement to get on board and play a major supporting role (though there was initial reluctance from some of the afl-cio’s anticommunist leaders, explained below). In contrast, the century-long alliance between American unions and the Labor Zionist movement—which ultimately relied on systematically ignoring, downplaying, and denying the fundamental rights of Palestinians—would serve (and continues to serve) as a major obstacle to US labor putting its weight behind the bds movement.

#### U.S. labor law is not a shield for workers but an instrument of empire — by aligning unions with Zionism, it enlists organized labor in the reproduction of colonial violence. The Jewish Labor Committee’s transformation from anti-Zionist resistance to loyal enforcer of Histadrut propaganda shows how labor officialdom was co-opted into the Nakba itself, proving that U.S. trade union structures were never autonomous but embedded in a racial–imperial project that silences rank-and-file dissent and criminalizes solidarity.

Adely et al. 15[Michael Letwin, Suzanne Adely, and Jaime Veve, 12-2015, "Project MUSE", No Publication, <https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/605050/summary?casa_token=sFiCMTkEY6cAAAAA:yeN1Idiu3dn7QFBBeOX1qRMUdjnztFgpFN3GFx0OeMSpkh4tSHDY2yNYnVLdzWT0G6eozcPoBfI>] omard

Recent years have seen rapidly growing momentum behind the Palestinian call for boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS), particularly in the wake of repeated Israeli attacks on Gaza since 2008–9 that have left thousands dead, maimed, and homeless. In February 2007, as part of this campaign, Palestinian trade union bodies appealed directly for support, including a request for international labor to cut ties with the Histadrut, the Zionist labor federation. Although these calls have received wide-ranging support from trade unionists in South Africa, the UK, Ireland, Canada, Norway, and elsewhere, Labor Zionism remains ubiquitous in the United States. This first dates to the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and establishment of the Histadrut in 1920. Such US Labor Zionism grew rapidly in the 1940s, as a combined result of the Nazi Holocaust, the Cold War, neocolonialism, and the USSR’s pivotal support for establishment of the Israel state. Even then, however, it has never had significant working-class roots. Since the Nakba of 1947–49, Labor Zionism in the United States has been promoted by the Histadrut’s US mouthpiece, the Jewish Labor Committee (JLC). Through such efforts, closely coordinated with Israeli officials, the JLC has organized trade union leaders’ support for Zionism. Notable challenges to this dominant Labor Zionism began in the late 1960s. These include positions taken by the League of Revolutionary Black Workers in 1967 and wildcat strikes against the United Auto Workers (UAW) leadership’s support for Israel in 1973. Since September 11, 2001, Israel’s wars and othder apartheid policies have been challenged by New York City Labor Against the War (NYCLAW), Labor for Palestine, ILWU Local 10 dockworkers, UAW Local 2865 graduate students at the University of California, the United Electrical Workers, and others. Increasingly, such efforts have made common cause with racial justice and other movements, and—at the margins—have begun to crack Labor Zionism’s seemingly impregnable hold in the United States. These recent developments run parallel to, and draw inspiration from, the American Studies Association’s own endorsement of BDS on December 13, 2013. Challenging US Labor Zionism | 1047 2015 The American Studies Association [129.62.10.92] Project MUSE (2025-08-13 19:17 GMT) Baylor University Libraries 1048 | American Quarterly Zionist Roots in US Labor Through the 1930s Jewish workers in the United States were adamantly anti- Zionist.1 Jewish Bundists viewed Zionism as a “sinister deviation from the true path . . . a mirage, compounded of religious romanticism and chauvinism,” and after the Nazis took power in 1933, “many Jews within American labor vehemently opposed Zionist efforts.”2 For example, the JLC, founded in 1934 to oppose the rise of Nazism, noted that the great bulk of Jewish labor in the United States are . . . of the opinion that the Jewish question must be solved in the countries in which Jews live and therefore must be solved as part of the more general question of re-adjusting the economic, political, social and cultural life of our country to the needs of a new day.3 In the 1940s, however, US labor leaders enlisted in the Histadrut’s well- orchestrated campaign for a Jewish state in Palestine,4 and finally won support of the previously anti-Zionist JLC.5 These efforts helped enable the impending Nakba (Catastrophe). Labor leaders established the National Trade Union Emergency Conference on Labor Palestine, which won over Jewish Bundists; silenced anti-Zionist holdouts;6 exploited rank-and-file workers’ sympathy for Holocaust victims;7 and helped convince Truman to support partition8 and lift the US arms embargo against the Zionist militias.9 The Zionism of these labor officials was closely linked to their support for US imperialism, anticommunism,10 and racism against workers of color in the United States.11 This was consistent with Israel’s self-proclaimed role as “watchdog” for US imperial interests.12 Meanwhile, nearly all of the US labor Left mirrored the USSR’s indispensable support for establishment of the Israeli state.13 In the subsequent decades, US trade union leaders across the political spectrum supported Israeli wars,14 charged “anti-Semitism” against those who criticized Israel’s close alliance with apartheid South Africa,”15 and bought huge quantities of State of Israel Bonds,16 which paralleled overall US government economic and military support for the Israeli state. Labor Anti-Zionism The first postwar challenge to Labor Zionism in the United States came from the Detroit-based League of Revolutionary Black Workers in January 1969, which recognized Palestinian oppression as a reflection of the same system of racism and colonialism suffered by black South Africans, Vietnamese, Latin Americans, and African Americans.17 On October 14, 1973, Detroit was the site of the first industrial action against US labor officials’ support for Israel, when three thousand Arab autoworkers joined a wildcat strike to protest UAW Local 600’s purchase (without membership approval) of $300,000 in Israel Bonds. On November 28, 1973, Arab and other autoworkers struck to pro- test bestowal of B’nai B’rith’s “Humanitarian Award” on International UAW president Leonard Woodcock.18 The next visible labor opposition to Zionism came in the wake of September 11, 2001. On April 18, 2002, Local 10 of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), a largely African American union with a long social justice history, condemned Israel’s attacks on the West Bank and “call[ed] for the halt of all military aid to the State of Israel.”19 That same day, NYCLAW, a grassroots, interracial organization formed immediately after September 11, 2001,20 linked its overall opposition to the pretextual US “War Against Terror” by calling for an end to US military aid to Israel, Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, and support for the Palestinian right of return and Israeli military resisters.21 NYCLAW also spearheaded unity between two separate coalitions behind a march in DC on April 20, 2002, the first post- 9/11 national antiwar protest, in which 150,000 marched with the largest Palestinian contingent in US history.22 Such efforts were accompanied by a small number of local labor resolutions criticizing Israel.23 Ironically, this emerging labor solidarity with Palestine was blunted by formation of U.S. Labor Against the War in January 2003, whose leadership was dominated by full-time union staffers who argued that criticism of Israel would jeopardize support from major unions.24 Nonetheless, NYCLAW and its allies continued to fight for inclusion of Pal- estine in the antiwar movement. In April 2004 the Second National Convention of Al-Awda: The Palestinian Right to Return Coalition, adopted NYCLAW’s proposal for a campaign against US labor’s complicity with Israel.25 Toward that end, in October 2004, NYCLAW and Al-Awda NY jointly established Labor for Palestine, whose founding statement called on trade unionists to (1) fully support Palestinian national, democratic, and labor rights throughout historical Palestine, including the right of all Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and land; (2) demand an end to US military and economic sup- port for Israeli apartheid; (3) divest all labor investments in Israeli apartheid; and (4) affiliate with Labor for Palestine.26 The founding of LFP spurred additional efforts. In 2006 NYCLAW and several other labor antiwar groups denounced Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Gaza.27 On October 19, 2007, the Chief, New York City’s civil service newspa- Challenging US Labor Zionism | 1049 [129.62.10.92] Project MUSE (2025-08-13 19:17 GMT) Baylor University Libraries 1050 | American Quarterly per, published a letter from NYCLAW members defending BDS as “no more unfairly selective or one-sided than the isolation of apartheid South Africa, a campaign in which we and many others actively participated,” and pointing out that “this boycott—many of whose supporters are Jewish—does not target Israel for its ethnicity, but for theft and colonization of Arab lands, denial of equality to Arab-Palestinians in Israel, and violation of Palestinian refugees’ right to return home.”28 On March 23, 2008, NYCLAW condemned new Israeli attacks on Gaza and pointed out that “through a combination of intent, ignorance and/or expediency, much of labor officialdom in this country—often without the knowledge or consent of union members—is an accomplice of Israeli Apart- heid.”29 On June 5, 2008, fifteen union members and other activists joined an emergency NYCLAW-LFP picket line in front of a “Celebration” of the “60th Anniversary of Israel” held at American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) District Council 37, the largest municipal workers’ union in New York.30 The next trigger was “Operation Cast Lead,” Israel’s brutal attack on Gaza in 2008–9. On December 31, 2008, NYCLAW echoed the Congress of South African Trade Unions and other international labor bodies by denouncing the attack, which it put in the context of “Israel’s ongoing dispossession and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians since before the Nakba (Catastrophe) of 1948,” and reaffirmed “support for the international Boycotts, Sanctions and Divestment campaign, including an immediate end to all support for Israel—including that provided by US labor leaders.”31 On December 4, 2009, LFP issued an open letter challenging AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka’s opposition to BDS. The letter, signed by scores of trade unionists, called for divestment from Israel Bonds, support for workers’ refusal to handle Israeli cargo, an end to ties with the Histadrut, and opposition to US aid for Israel.32 Trade union BDS further escalated in the wake of Israel’s lethal May 2010 attack on the Mavi Marmara, an unarmed Turkish merchant vessel carrying humanitarian relief to Gaza in the wake of the Israeli 2008–9 attacks. On June 8, 2010, the executive board of ILWU Local 10 issued a unanimous condemnation of the massacre and a “call for unions to protest by any action they choose to take.”33 This statement was particularly significant, since ILWU members had refused to handle cargo for Nazi Germany (1934), fascist Italy (1935), Chile (1978), apartheid South Africa (1984), and US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (2008).34 On June 9, 2010, 133 US trade unionists signed Labor for Palestine’s response, which reaffirmed the BDS call.35 Most importantly, on June 20, 2010, members of ILWU locals 10 and 34 in Oakland reaffirmed their tradition of industrial action for social justice by honoring an eight-hundred-strong picket line against the Israeli-owned Zim Shenzhen ship—the first US labor-based BDS action.36 On December 2, 2010, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) announced that it had become “the first union in the US and the third union in Canada to officially support the Palestinian United Call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions.”37 On June 13, 2011, in the wake of another Israeli massacre in Gaza, fifty supporters of LFP and other organizations picketed a NYC Israel Bonds “celebration” chaired by Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union and JLC head Stuart Ap- pelbaum, at which New York State AFL-CIO president Dennis Hughes was awarded a “Peace Medal.”38 The next major spark was Israel’s renewed war on Gaza in July 2014. Hundreds of trade unionists signed LFP’s July 28, 2014 statement reiterating its calls for an end to aid for Israel; for “workers to emulate dockers in South Africa, India, Sweden, Norway, Turkey, the US west coast, and elsewhere, by refusing to handle military or any other cargo destined for Israel”; and for “la- bor bodies to divest from Israel Bonds, and cut ties with the Histadrut, Israel’s racist labor federation.”39 On July 29, 2014, the eighty-three member Joint Council of UAW Local 2865, representing thirteen thousand graduate student workers throughout the University of California, responded to Palestinian trade union and Labor for Palestine appeals by submitting a BDS resolution for a full membership vote.40 Israel’s 2014 assault on Gaza also set off an unprecedented community- labor campaign against Zim Integrated Shipping Services, Israel’s largest cargo shipping company (and tenth largest in the world).41 On August 16, 2014, a coalition of seventy San Francisco Bay Area organizations led by the Arab Resource and Organizing Center (AROC) responded to a call from the Pales- tinian General Federation of Trade Unions by mobilizing a mass community picket under the banner of Block the Boat for Gaza to prevent unloading of the Israeli vessel Zim Piraeus.42 Countering Zim’s attempts to evade the picket, over three thousand people marched to the docks, chanting “When people are occupied, resistance is justified” and “From Ferguson to Palestine, occupation is a crime.” When the ship finally docked, ILWU Local 10 members responded to various pickets, some organized independently of AROC, by refusing to unload it for four consecutive days.43 These events were mirrored by solidar- ity actions in New York City, Long Beach, Seattle/Tacoma, and Vancouver, and were widely covered in the international press.44 Inspired by the victory in August, another picket was called by the Stop Zim Action Committee on Challenging US Labor Zionism | 1051 [129.62.10.92] Project MUSE (2025-08-13 19:17 GMT) Baylor University Libraries 1052 | American Quarterly September 27, which Local 10 members honored by not working the Zim Shanghai.45 On October 25, Block the Boat once again preempted the ship’s return to Oakland,46 and Zim line has subsequently abandoned attempts to return to Oakland or Los Angeles.47 On December 4, 2014, in the wake of these events, UAW 2865 mem- bers voted by 65 percent to adopt their leadership’s BDS proposal. Thus the union had “become the first major U.S. labor union to hold a membership vote responding to the Palestinian civil society call for boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israeli occupation and in solidarity with Palestinian self-determination.”48 Nine months later, the United Electrical Workers, with thirty-five thousand members, became the second national union (after the IWW) in the United States to endorse BDS.49 Significantly, both of these resolutions embraced the full BDS call, which demands not only an end to the 1967 occupation but equality for Palestinians with Israeli citizenship and refugees’ right of return. Conclusion Zionism has long been the default position in US labor. However, there has been another, hidden tradition of postwar labor anti-Zionism that began with Detroit in 1969–73 and has slowly reemerged after September 11, 2011, from the antiwar, Palestine solidarity, and racial justice movements. As shown above, such efforts have the potential to play an increasingly important role in the growing BDS movement.